The Last Great Depression of the XXth Century: A Dynamical Approach by iulia igescu





60313 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Tel: +49 69 20973312
Fax: +49 69 20973500
e-mail:iulia.igescu@globalinsight.com∗
August 7, 2005
∗I would like to thank David DeJong and John Duﬀy from University of Pittsburgh for
their commentsThe Last Great Depression of the XXth
Century: a Dynamical Approach
Abstract
The dramatic fall in output in eastern Europe in the 90s was a
result of the institutional structure imposed by the state - taken here
as exogenous - on the production process. Consider therefore an eco-
nomic system where the state is promoting a policy of ’forced capital
formation’ to fund a technology that produces higher output. The
drawback is that such an economic system becomes internally unsta-
ble: even though economic growth takes place in the short run, in the
long run the economy moves into a transition towards a stable lower
income (unless the relationship between the political sector and the
economy changes and the state withdraws from the capital formation
process). As output loss reached the level of another Great Depression,
peculiarities of this phenomenon in East Europe can bring new insight
into what is triggering great depressions.1F orced Capital Formation or Disorganization?
Let us start from the ’peculiar’ evolution of per capita output in eastern
European countries during the so-called transition process which oﬃcially
started in 1989. It is peculiar because the current theory of endogenous
growth cannot give us a satisfactory answer as to why that happenned. For
example Poland had two consecutive years of distress, so that by 1991 it
had lost one quarter of its 1989-GDP. The economy recovered fast, and in
2004 stood at 40% above its 1989 output.
On the other hand dramatic cases case such as Russia existed, too. By
1998 it had lost almost half of its starting output - a result of nine consec-
utive years of negative growth rates. The economy began to recover, yet in
2004 the output was still 15% below its 1989 level (see ﬁgure 1). In 2004 Ro-
mania was still 6% and Bulgaria 15% below their pre-transition GDP level.
For ﬁfteen years these countries have faced widely spread idle human and
physical capital. Partly responsible for the decline were the external shocks,
such as the disintegration of the trade system that linked these countries
(and in the case of Russia the disintegration of the Soviet Union). However,
that alone could not explain these persistently diﬀerent transition paths
after such a long period of time.
Leaving aside the already mentioned external factors, Blanchard and
Kremer (1997) explore the possibility of lower output levels in these countries
due to internal changes, such as ‘disorganization’. Under central planning,
write the authors, many ﬁrms relied on a single supplier. When transition
started it was enough for specialized producers to be unable to fulﬁll their
contracts (because the coercive power of the state disappeared) to generate
a chain-reaction whose end-result was a decline in output. Their paper ac-
knowledges the particularity of the production process in these countries:
the massive implication of the state in production, as a force centrally re-
sponsible for capital accumulation and investment decisions. However, their
explanation would also mean that the withdrawal of the state from pro-
duction caused the output to decline. In this case it is no clear why any
state would want to generate large scale unemployment and poverty. One
could again give as an example central-eastern Europe where output was in
2004 30-40% higher then at the starting point in 1989 - and claim therefore
as rationale for a state withdrawal higher output in the long-run. On the
other hand there is also the example of eastern European countries - after
15 years of transition still below their 1989 output level - case in which the
state withdrawal could be accused of another Great Depression.
1In order to ﬁnd an explanation for this rather abrupt economic pol-
icy change of the state, I would like to point out another feature of these
economies: an accelerated industrialization process and notable output growth
in the ﬁrst years of state intervention through forced redistribution of re-
sources from agriculture and consumption. Industrialization was made pos-
sible by a policy of ’forced capital formation’: the state made the investment
decisions and asked from the population mandatory savings by deciding how
much output was directed to investment. Savings were directed to ’strategic’
industries, owned by the state. Successful in the short-run, its shine started
fading away in the 80s when the ﬁrst signs surfaced that the system needed
a fundamental structural reform.
With this aspect in mind, a possible theoretical explanation for the pe-
culiar evolution of output in the above mentioned countries could be that
an economic system where state intervenes to force capital accumulation,
even though it might have positive eﬀects on output in the short run, is in-
ternally unstable in the long run. Therefore the state had to withdraw from
the production process because the institutional structure imposed on the
economy by its intervention had brought the system into a crisis long before
’transition’ oﬃcially started - negative rates of growth hidden under barter
and ﬁnancial arrears were ubiquitous in the late 80s. It had become obvi-
ous that this institutional structure could bring an economic system into a
deeper crises, even Great Depression - if a reform of the production process
did not occur. This paper will look at the output ’transition’ paths from
this perspective. In this way it becomes possible to bring new insight into
the current debate about the nature of great depressions. Cole and Ohanian
(1999) as well as a series of articles in RED (2002) looked at great depres-
sions using neoclassical growth theory in order to ﬁnd out what might have
caused this type of crisis in the XXth century around the world - starting
with depressions in the 30s in Western Europe, Norden America, and ending
with those of Latin America in the 80s. Even though the debate remains
open, one major conclusion seems to be that the decline of output in the
30s was an unintended consequence of new labor market institutions and
industrial policies designed to improve the performance of the economy. Es-
pecially in Europe, as Beaudry and Portier (2002) or Fisher and Hornstein
(2002) show, an increase in the role of state in designing labor institutions
(the government imposed collective bargaining on wage, the workweek was
reduced) and increased public expenditure for production (preparing the
economies for war) explain most of the economic decline in the depression,
as well as the recovery. The puzzle of the slow recovery in the US remains.
2Ohanian (2001) ﬁnds organization capital (the knowledge ﬁrms used to or-
ganize production - as deﬁned by Prescott and Visscher (1980)) a promising
explanation for the productivity decrease in the US in the 1930’s. Break-
downs in supplier-customer relationships, says the author, have reduced the
eﬃciency of production by requiring managers to shift from production into
market search activities. These breakdowns could have also forced ﬁrms
to adopt leading-edge technologies. Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) show that
the productivity of plants that adopt new technologies is initially lower be-
cause ﬁrms have to accumulate new organization capital to operate them
eﬃciently - that might have also caused the lower productivity in the US in
the 1930’s.
If the Great Depression of the 30s became associated with higher state
intervention in production, the Great Depression of the 90s in East Europe
had as consequence a withdrawal of the state from production. Moreover,
the need for organization capital accumulation played an important role in
East Europe, too. The goal therefore is to incorporate the eﬀects of state
intervention in the dynamics of capital accumulation (and its component
organization capital). Organization capital at the level of the ﬁrm, as in
Prescott and Visscher (1980), includes improved matching between person-
nel and jobs, the ability to create eﬃcient teams, the human capital of its
employees. Organization capital at the level of the economy should also in-
clude the position of the state regarding how ﬁrms deal with suppliers and
customers, or how they deal with their own employees, access to information
about the organization structure of other ﬁrms, access to infrastructure and
funding for improved working conditions.
The starting point is a Diamond overlapping generation model where
agents work and save when young and consume when old. The main feature
of the production function is a state presence in capital accumulation, jus-
tiﬁed by the existence of a low-development equilibrium as in Azariadis and
Drazen (1990). Productive government has previously been modelled in the
literature mostly as a ﬂow of government expenditure. Examples are Barro
(1989) and (1990), Turnovsky and Fischer (1995), Turnovsky (1996). This
speciﬁcation makes models easy to track, yet since insofar public expendi-
ture represented mainly infrastructure, it is in fact an accumulated stock
rather than a ﬂow. Arrow and Kurz (1970) were the ﬁrst to model gov-
ernment expenditure as a form of investment, as a stock. Baxter and King
(1993), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) followed suit. Futagami, Morita and
Shibata (1993) are diﬀerent, in the sense that they introduce government
capital as pure public good, along with private capital. I will approach this
3issue diﬀerently - the state is imposing an institutional structure onto the
production function, embedded through organization capital into total cap-
ital (let aside the fact that in former command economies there was almost
no private capital). This institutional structure is modelled as an extension
of Day (1982, 1983) and with a variable forcing parameter. The higher is the
level of this parameter, the heavier is the government presence in capital ac-
cumulation. In countries that are poor in organization capital governments
will opt for high forcing parameters because they generate faster rates of
capital growth in the short run. As long as the total capital in the economy
is lower than the organization capital needed by the technology to oper-
ate eﬃciently, the institutional structure will play a positive role in overall
capital accumulation. The drawback is the inherent dynamical instability
of such an economy. Once total capital is above the organization capital
level, the economy can move into a transition path towards a lower stable
income and experience capital destruction. This transition path is mod-
elled in the following way: when the forcing parameter is allowed to vary,
at some points the dynamics of the system changes; new output equilibria
are created and the stability of the old ones changes, too (theory calls them
bifurcation points). In this case the equilibrium with high output becomes
unstable. At this point the economy has to change its institutional structure
to take advantage of its level of organization capital already attained and
shift its current capital into a production function able to generate growth
without state intervention.
Parts 2 and 3 present the model and propose a production function
that acknowledges the presence of the state’s forcing factor in capital accu-
mulation. Parts 4 and 5 include a numerical simulation that looks at the
evolution of capital in equilibrium under various degrees of forcing. They
describe a new type of bifurcation called ’crisis’ induced by the presence of
the state in capital accumulation, which could wipe out physical capital.
Part 6 concludes.
2T he Model
The production function is integrated into a two-period scalar Diamond
overlapping generation model. The time t good is produced with a technol-
ogy that uses as input labor and the time t-1 good, stored from time t-1
to time t,w h i c hi st i m et capital. A number of simplifying assumptions are
made: there are no government bonds and no storage. Individuals are paid
4wages for their labor inputs. They are endowed with labor only in the ﬁrst
period of their life. When young, individuals can choose to save some part
of their wage. As this is a closed economy where capital is scarce, wages are
the only source of savings in the model. In equilibrium the aggregate sav-
ings of the young will be the next period’s capital stock. All capital carried
over from date t depreciates during period t+1. Given some initial level of
capital stock carried over from period 0, the equilibrium paths of the capital











t = wt − zt, (2)
ct
t+1 = zt Rt+1. (3)
Here, ct
t is consumption at time t of an agent born at time t, while ct
t+1
is consumption at time t+1 of an agent born at time t. Savings at time t are
zt, interest rates Rt+1 and wages wt. Moreover, it is assumed that agents
smooth consumption over time, which means that their savings are always
a constant share of wage (Azariadis, 1993, pp. 75-78).
Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) model an economy where each house-
hold produces its own consumption goods because individual households
are too small to use specialized inputs economically with a modern technol-
ogy. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) point to the existence of low-development
equilibria in the context of an OLG model with human capital accumula-
tion. They develop a case in which the education technology diplays pos-
itive threshold externalities. Then, if the previous generation has insuﬃ-
ciently invested in education, investing in education becomes unattractive
for the current generations. Therefore an equilibrium of low growth can nat-
urally coexist with a high-growth path where all generations invest above
the threshold level. They also suggest a role for government intervention in
the education sector, to avoid low-development equilibria. Following their
idea, I will modify the production function to allow for a positive thresh-
old externality in capital accumulation, and make room therefore for the
5government intervention in this process. The threshold will be now the or-
ganization capital, aggregate at the level of economy, speciﬁc to the new
technology.




ks if kt < k
g(kt) if kt ≥ k
where g(kt) is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable, and
dg
dk as well as
d2g
dk2
are positive. This form of production suggests a less developed economy
that produces at the subsistence level ks as long as the stock of capital in
the economy is below the organization capital level (k) needed by a modern
technology.
The technology described in the ﬁrst part of the above equation could
be seen as simple techniques requiring a certain quantity of labor to produce
an output able to assure the subsistence of labor rather than capital accu-
mulation. If previous generations have produced at subsistence, and had
therefore no possibility to add to the organization capital needed to adopt
modern technologies (with increasing returns to scale), the new generations
will not ﬁnd attractive to accumulate capital. In this way the economy
remains in a stable equilibrium, with the old way of subsistence production.
Consider therefore a government which assumes a policy of ‘forced capital
formation’ model as a function of the form p(k,Œ), so that f(kt) becomes
now:
f(kt)=m a x{ks,g (kt)p(kt,Œ)} if kt < k
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) study the dynamic equilibria of a Dia-
mond model augmented by a function At that depends on social inputs
not controlled by any producer. Among these inputs the literature counts
for economy-wide averages of private inputs (Lucas, 1988), lagged values of
output or input (Arrow, 1962), knowledge (Romer, 1986). The At function
becomes now p(k,Œ), is called a ’forcing factor’, and depends on the orga-
nization capital of the economy. For example in East Europe government
found suppliers and clients for ﬁrms and actively intervened in matching
jobs and people. It also set wages for all types of workers. This is prob-
ably what Blanchard and Kremer (1997) call ’coercive power’ of the state.
6The degree of state intervention in capital accumulation is measured by the
forcing parameter Œ. One would suspect that the lower the initial stocks
of capital in the economy, the stronger should the government intervene in
forcing capital accumulation, therefore the bigger Œ has to be.
Knowing that the real interest rate is Rt+1 = f (kt+1)+1− δ and
the wage is wt =m a x{ks,f (kt) − ktf (kt)}, the result of the optimization






In this case, the savings function, z(R,w) is determined as
z(R,w) = arg max0≤z≤w u(w − z,Rz)
and the optimum consumption pair (ˆ ct
t,ˆ ct
t+1)i sg i v e nb y : ˆ ct
t = wt −
z(Rt+1,w t)a n dˆ ct
t+1 = Rt+1 z(Rt+1,w t).
The capital market clears when
(1 + n)kt+1 − z
 
f (kt+1)+1− δ,f(kt) − ktf (kt)
 
=0 , (5)
where n is the population growth rate. The solution to this equation de-
scribes how the economy may behave at any point in time when it starts from
a given capital position k0 <k s. If the two dated consumption goods are
not substitutes, the savings function can be locally decreasing in the inter-
est factor R. That makes the existence of multiple forward-looking equilibria
possible (Azariadis, 1993, pp. 75-78).
2.1 Capital Accumulation
Consider the following notation:
G(kt,Œ) = z
 
f (kt+1)+1− δ,f(kt) − ktf (kt)
 
.
Solve equation (5) to get:
kt+1 =m a x{(1 − s)ks,G(kt,Œ)}. (6)





going to zero in the long run, but
it is ﬂatter than the 45 degree line at the origin and has an even number of
7nontrivial steady states. Because savings are not everywhere increasing in
the interest rate, equation (6) can be solved only locally and it is not manda-
tory that two stable steady states are separated by an unstable one. That
could give rise to bifurcations: points at which a steady state is changing
its stability properties. The political sector exogenously acts through the
forcing parameter Œ, taken as given by the optimizing agents, to transform
the stability of the positive steady states. As long as the capital stock is
below the threshold level, the state has a positive inﬂuence on growth. How-
ever, once the organization capital k has been reached, the political sector
deters further capital accumulation. In this case the state has to withdraw
from capital accumulation. Note that organization capital is embedded in
total capital. As Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) estimated, organization capital
was about two thirds of total physical capital stock in the US in 1959-1999.
Therefore by accumulating capital, an economy is accumulating organization
capital, too.
3A P roduction Function with a Forcing Factor
It is easier to grasp the statements in the previous section by
looking at a concrete form of the production function,
f(kt)=
 
ks if kt < k
k1+a
t if kt ≥ k
(7)
with a ∈ (0,1], and ks <k t. As long as the level of social capital is not
met the economy chooses a subsistence path.
Day (1982, 1983) introduced a pollution eﬀect caused by increasing con-
centrations of capital (the logistic map) into the neoclassical production
function with constant savings ratio. I consider a modiﬁed version of Day’s
function to model the forcing factor of capital accumulation. The aggregate











is the government ‘forcing
factor’, whose role is to switch to the new, capital intensive production
function. At low levels of indigenous capital (kt < k) its eﬀect on capi-
tal accumulation is positive, but it becomes negative once the society has
8accumulated capital (kt > k): it has a ’polluting’ eﬀect resembling Day’s
function. Normalize the threshold capital level to 1.
Notice that with a and Œ ﬁxed, for high levels of capital 1 + a<Œk
and the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. For low
values of capital 1 + a>Œk, increasing returns to scale occur. If k is
given, a higher a needs bigger forcing parameters (big Œ) to keep the above
inequalities unchanged. Moreover, if a is given, the lower the initial starting
point k is, the bigger has Œ to be.
It is straightforward to prove that the function J(kt,k t+1)=kt+1 −
G(kt,Œ) is in this case invertible (see appendix). In this way it eliminates
equilibria with the same initial conditions that could display diﬀerent asymp-
totic behavior, as in Boldrin (1992); the existence of external factors that
can push a country to a high or a low output level is ruled out. Moreover, it





is increasing in capital (showing the positive eﬀects the government has in
capital accumulation).
The next step is to describe the numerical evolution of the capital stock
for various forcing parameters Œ.
4A N umerical Example
In the production function (8) with no population growth, i.e. n is 0,
and with a logarithmic utility function the fraction of savings is s = 1
2 of
the wage. To compute numerical solutions or interpret results, one more
change in notation is made: deﬁne kt to be the stock of capital in excess
of the capital levels chosen by an economy in subsistence. With consumers
that save only a constant share of the wage, the only way to increase capital
stocks is by inﬂuencing the wage levels (a policy often used by governmens
in East Europe, for example). That is why the government intervention can
be viewed as one of ‘forced capital formation’.






t exp[−Œ(kt − 1)]
 
(9)
Utility maximization agents would have saved zero capital (k =0 )i n
excess of the level required for reproducing the subsistence output. The
government forces them now to take some capital level k0 in excess of k =0
and use it for the new way of production.
9The role of the government is to help the economy accumulate enough
resources to pay for the organization capital k = 1. The ﬁrms are taking
the institutional structure imposed by the government to the production
function as given. The optimization problem of the government and of
the private agent is therefore identical, case in which the capital therefore
cannot be viewed as merely private capital. Due the inﬂuence of government
part of it is being accumulated as organization capital needed by modern
technologies. Organization capital will in turn increase production levels,
the wage level of the agents, and will allow for higher consumption. In this
way the policy of forced capital formation generates positive eﬀects in the
economy.
4.1 Returns to Capital - Calibrating a
Increasing returns to scale generate multiple equilibria. In calibrating the
present model I take into account Cole and Ohanian (1999) who show that
aggregate returns cannot be measured with precision. A conservative level
for a could be a =0 .5. Later on, I will study the eﬀects of diﬀerent values
of a on Œ and examine how the degree of returns to capital changes the
results.
4.2 The Forcing Factor - Calibrating Œ
Œ is taken by agents as given, and it is therefore an exogenous variable
imposed on the economy by the government. Government, on the other
hand, chooses its level based on its economic policies. One such policy,
for example, could be as in Barro (1990) a government that maximizes the
savings of the agents at the starting point t = 0. However, in this model,
Œ depends on the level of a. Therefore, in the beginning I will keep a
ﬁxed and use numerical simulations to ﬁnd out those values of Œ able to
generate dynamics matching the evolution of output in East Europe. I will
later on let a vary and ﬁnd the range in which Œ has economic meaning -
this should therefore be the range of Œ values available to the government.
Since this is an exogenous variable, given by a, and government actions
are embedded in total capital, the maximization policy of the private agent
cannot be diﬀerent from that of the government. There will therefore be
range of values rather one optimum level of Œ.
105D ynamics
As an example, ﬁgure 2 shows an economy with a forcing factor that could
well describe the evolution of the former communist countries. The starting
point is a low capital level. Forced capital accumulation induces economic
growth. However, after approximately two generations, the institutional
structure imposed by a government that allows no freedom in investment
patterns becomes visible in the negative externalities it generates in pro-
duction. Unless a reform occurs to reduce forced investments, the country
could start a new transition whose outcome is a stable and lower output
level, a transition whose characteristic is negative growth rates in capital
and output. Note that zero output, a subsistence economy, is always a sta-
ble equilibrium in this model. The subsistence equilibrium aside, there are
two more steady states whose stability changes with Œ. The levels of Œ at
which the dynamical properties of the system change are called bifurcation
points (a complete bifurcation diagram is presented in the appendix). For
example we would like to ﬁnd out when an economy would move from a sys-
tem with one stable subsistence equilibrium, to a system with two or three
equilibria, eventually stable and with higher output levels. In particular, we
are interested in ﬁnding those levels of the forcing parameter at which an
economy will experience transition movements between levels of capital and
output as described in ﬁgure 2.
As already stated, the poorer in capital is the economy at the star-
ting point, the higher should be the forcing parameter. Simulations show
that with an a =0 .5 and an economy starting very low in capital, close
to subsistence - an assumption made for the former-communist countries
- a bifurcation called ’crisis’ (see Grebogi et el., 1983 for a more detailed
description) occurs when the forcing parameter is Œ = 3.974. Hence all
forcing parameteres above this level generate dynamics as expected: one or
two periods (generations) of positive growth, followed by consequent periods
of negative growth rates implying losses in capital stock and output. In this
case a movement - a transition - to a new production structure is required.
Slow transitions, such as those in Russia or Romania, experience long peri-
ods of negative growth - because this means that the country still has most
of its capital on the old production function, which brings it slowly into the
stable subsistence output.
The appendix describe the various bifurcations points, as well as the
relationship between a and Œ. It shows graphically that the forcing param-
eter is an increasing function of a, and that Œ takes values between 2 and
115, when a ∈ (0,1].
6C onclusion
An institutional structure imposed by the state was used in a model
of economic growth in order to capture the long-run eﬀects of forced capital
accumulation and to explain the large loss in output in eastern Europe. The
decrease in output was generated by the economic system itself, rather than
by some external shocks.
Some conclusions are to be drawn here. It is most likely that no modern
economy can take advantage of technological progress without organization
capital. Ohanian (2001) seems to lean on this side when he claims than in the
1930s shocks - which are still to be identiﬁed - caused a loss of organization
capital and contributed to the Great Depression. However, at that time East
Europe was confronted with the agrarian nature of its production process.
Governments stepped in to help these economies accumulate enough capital
such that modern large-scale technologies could be implemented. However,
these countries were also lacking organization capital. What the state did
was to force capital accumulation by investing into human capital formation
and infrastructure, by creating for each ﬁrm suppliers and clients through
planned investments, by setting up a wage scale for all employees, and ﬁxing
consummer price levels. The failure of this mode of production ﬁfty years
later in all countries in East Europe, after some notable progress, probably
means that this kind of intervention is desirable only when a country re-
mains poor in organization capital. That might also be the reason why the
Great Depression in the 30s had as consequence more state intervention in
the production process (for a longer time in Europe, for a shorter time in the
US). Only the state can stop a hemorrhage of organization capital, or only
the state can pay for some of its components - for example by demanding
better working conditions for workers, or by investing in better infrastruc-
ture. Most likely these newly added components to capital organization help
the economy replace old technologies and restart the cycle of physical and
human capital accumulation at a new level, qualitatively and quantitatively
higher.
Second, once enough organization capital has been accumulated, the
economy should choose on its own its future investment patterns, otherwise
“crises” that generate transitions to low levels of output occur. That was
more evident in eastern Europe rather than in central-eastern Europe, which
12recovered much faster. One explanation for these diﬀerent paths, as given
by the model presented here, could be that the successive negative rates of
growth in output in the former countries were signs of a slow reform. With
state being forced out of the production process, the relationship between
ﬁrms and state had to change. Firms had to search on their own for new
suppliers and clients - an important part of their organization capital and
previously an attribute of the state. To ﬁnd or develop new markets is a
slow process. Firms were losing both physical and organizational capital,
and the state could not intervene further - without generating corruption
and ineﬃciencies. With domestic capital diminishing countries that man-
aged to attract foreign capital and successfully incorporate new elements
of organization capital into their economies recovered faster. However, the
economy of the model presented above is a closed one and this process was
not addressed.
It seems plausible that there are cycles when organization capital, or
some of its components, moves from being stately-owned to being privately-
owned. As this paper does not consider a dynamic interaction between
physical and organization capital further research in this area is still required
to better explain the relationship between state and organization capital,
and between capital and capital organization.
A Bifurcations - Numerical Results
T h e s er e s u l t sa r ed o n ew i t hal e v e lo fa ﬁxed at 0.5. There are three points
at which the dynamics of the system changes -there are therefore three
bifurcation points. One is at an Œ of 2.366, a saddle-node bifurcation, when
neoclassical growth starts. One is when Œ equals 3.122, a period-doubling
bifurcation, when long run evolutions of capital cannot be predicted. The
last one starts at 3.974 and it is a “crisis” bifurcation (see Grebogi et al.,
1983 for a more detailed description): the system is expected to collapse
after one or two generations of growth.
The bifurcation diagram is presented in ﬁgure 3. Note the following four
intervals:
• Œ is below 2.366
The economy remains trapped at subsistence levels of capital, the only
stable equilibrium.
13• Œ is between 2.366 and 3.122
The graph has two branches now. Equilibria on the lower, full line
branch are unstable. The dotted upper line represents stable and
higher capital levels. Countries that are historically endowed with
higher levels of capital (all capital levels above the full line) will behave
like the neo-classical, Solow-type models and will end up at the higher,
stable capital level. Practically there is no role for the state in the
process of capital accumulation. The region is therefore not interesting
for our theoretical exercise.
• Œ is between 3.122 and 3.974
In this region, the economy moves from a neoclassical type of growth
to one where stable output equilibria exhibit business cycles, as shown
in the upper branch of the diagram, making the evolution of the capital
in the long-run diﬃcult to predict (Sarkovskii’s theorem indicates that
at a cycle of 3 any type of cycle is possible, including chaos). Note that
these variations are stable. However, this region has been previously
studied by the economic literature with other type of externalities; its
dynamics is of no interest to our question.
• Œ is above 3.974
As the economy starts close to subsistence (all levels below the full
line), governments are justiﬁed to introduce a forcing factor. In this
case the upper branch with stable equilibria touches the lower, unsta-
ble branch, and a “crisis” surfaces: after periods of positive growth,
the economy starts a transition to the subsistence level of output, the
only stable equilibrium in this case. The region could be associated to
East Europe, where levels of intervention between 3.974 and 5 generate
one, or two periods of growth and then a loss of capital stock.
B The Degree of Intervention and Returns to Cap-
ital
Figure 4 describes the relationship between a and Œ at two main bifur-
cation points: when the stable and unstable branches meet in one unique
equilibrium (the saddle-node point), and when the capital starts its cycle-
chaotic behavior (the period-doubling point); it shows that the bigger a,t h e
bigger Œ. A third bifurcation point, the ’crisis’, it is unstable and cannot
14be shown in the picture. At the same time, the range of Œ is between 2 and
5, with ’crisis’ surfacing between 3 and 5.
C Bifurcations - Deﬁnitions
The general conditions for a map G to have a saddle-node bifurcation at a
non-hyperbolic ﬁxed point (k,Œ) equal to (0, 0) are described by
G(0,0) = 0
δG





δŒ(0,0)  =0 ,
2. δ2G
δk2 (0,0)  =0 .
Ap a i r( k,Œ )=( 0 ,0 )i saﬂ i pb i f u r c a t i o np o i n ti f :
G(0,0) = 0
δG





δŒ (0,0) = 0
δ2G2




δk3 (0,0)  =0

           
           
the second iterate of map G
undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation
at the same nonhyperbolic ﬁxed point.
DV a r i o u s P r o o f s
D.1 The map J(y) is invertible
Let y denote kt+1, and deﬁne the map J(y) as:
J(y)=y − z(R(y),w(x)).
15With a logarithmic utility function, the savings function z(y,x) is just a
constant s of the wage and:




In this case, with δJ
δy = 1, J(y) has no subsets with diﬀerent signs and
it is invertible. Given one level of x, there will be only one future y.
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Figure 2: Capital Accumulation with High Forcing Factors is not Sustainable
in the Long Run
20Figure 3: Bifurcation Diagram for Œ, with a = 0.5
21Figure 4: The Relationship between a and Œ
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